Spillover from the haven : cross-border externalities of patent box regimes within multinational firms by Schwab, Thomas & Todtenhaupt, Maximilian
Dis cus si on Paper No. 16-073
Spillover from the Haven:  
Cross-border Externalities of Patent Box 
Regimes within Multinational Firms 
Thomas Schwab and Maximilian Todtenhaupt
Dis cus si on Paper No. 16-073
Spillover from the Haven:  
Cross-border Externalities of Patent Box 
Regimes within Multinational Firms 
Thomas Schwab and Maximilian Todtenhaupt
Download this ZEW Discussion Paper from our ftp server:
http://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp16073.pdf
Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von  
neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung  
der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.
Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW  research prompt ly avai la ble to other  
eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly  
respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW.
Spillover from the Haven:
Cross-border Externalities of Patent Box Regimes
within Multinational Firms∗
Thomas Schwab1 and Maximilian Todtenhaupt2
1University of Mannheim, WU Vienna and ZEW
2University of Mannheim and ZEW
October 31, 2016
Abstract
This paper analyzes externalities of patent box regimes in Europe. Tax
reductions in foreign affiliates of a firm that also provide a profit shifting
opportunity reduce the user cost of capital and thereby increase domes-
tic investment. We test this mechanism for the case of research activity.
By combining information on patents, firm ownership data and specific
characteristics of patent box regimes, we show that patent box regimes
without nexus requirements for tax-efficient reallocation of patent profits
induce positive spillovers within multinational groups. The implementa-
tion of a patent box in a country one of the foreign affiliates of a firm re-
sides, increases domestic research activity by about 74 percent or 2 percent
per implied tax rate differential. Furthermore, our findings suggest that
patent boxes generate negative spillovers on average patent quality. This
has important implications for international tax policy and the evaluation
of patent box regimes.
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1 Introduction
Many governments have recognized the importance of technological progress and
corporate innovation for domestic productivity growth. Fostering research and
development (R&D) activity of firms is therefore one of the key objectives when
designing tax systems. In recent years, patent box regimes have become a very
relevant instrument in this policy field. Patent boxes allow firms to exempt a large
share of profits related to intangible assets (mainly patents)1 from taxation and
thus reduce the effective tax rate for these profits. They differ substantially in
their design, in particular with regard to the type of patents that are taxed at
the low patent box rates. In a global economy with strong international links,
such policies may generate substantial cross-border externalities. The goal of this
paper is to identify these spillovers of patent boxes and relate them to specific
characteristics of the individual regimes.
Even though most governments claim to implement patent boxes mainly to
facilitate domestic R&D activity, the emergence of these regimes has raised several
concerns. Not surprisingly, the cross-border externalities that we investigate in this
paper are at the heart of many of these issues. First, it is not certain that patent
boxes actually boost new R&D projects and thus increase the overall level of
corporate innovation. In response to the implementation of a more favorable tax
regime in one location, firms may merely relocate existing research activity. Such
a beggar-thy-neighbor effect is well-known for input-related R&D tax incentives
(Wilson, 2009). Second, the economic role of patent boxes is strongly debated.
In the best case, these regimes eliminate a market failure by increasing the net
return to R&D to a level that better reflects the positive externalities that arise
due to knowledge spillovers. In the worst case, patent boxes distort the efficient
allocation of R&D investment. Finally, patent box regimes decrease or increase
tax revenue. If a patent transfer is used as a cross-border profit shifting vehicle,
patent boxes reduce tax revenues in countries with higher effective tax burdens
and potentially also in patent box countries because of the lower rate. However, if
they spur innovation that raises future profits, tax revenue may actually increase
in the long-run.
Determining the sign and size of cross-border externalities of patent boxes
1Some patent boxes also allow for the inclusion of trade marks or other intellectual property.
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is thus important to characterize the role of such regimes in an international
context. In our paper, we analyze these externalities using micro-level evidence
from European firms. We link ownership information for a large number of firms to
R&D activity. The latter is measured as the number of granted patent applications
per firm and year.2 As we are interested in cross-border effects of patent boxes,
we focus on the research activity of firms that are located in countries without a
patent box regime. Cross-border links are established via multinational companies
with affiliates both in patent box countries and in countries without a patent box
regime implemented. We then estimate the effect of a patent box implementation
on the R&D activity of a firm that is located in a non-patent-box country and
has an affiliate in the implementing country.
In our analysis, we differentiate between patent box regimes with and without
nexus requirements. The former usually require at least part of the research activ-
ity to be carried out in the respective country for the resulting patents to be taxed
at the lower patent box rate. In contrast, the latter also tax patents that have
been generated elsewhere at the favorable rate. This is usually done by including
acquired patents in the patent box which provides firms with a simple profit shift-
ing opportunity. Corporations can conduct R&D at the location of their choice
and then transfer the resulting patent to a patent box location without nexus
requirements and benefit from the lower tax rates there. Patent box regimes with-
out nexus requirements thus lower the user cost of capital for R&D activity of
firms in other countries that have an inter-corporate link to it. This mechanism is
very similar to the role of tax havens in Hong & Smart (2010). In fact, this sim-
ilarity is not surprising as countries that implement patent boxes without nexus
requirement effectively become tax havens for a particular asset. We thus expect
these regimes to generate positive cross-border externalities on R&D activity. For
patent boxes with some nexus requirement, such an effect should not be observed
since the profit shifting opportunity that also reduces the tax burden in other
countries is limited.
We test these hypotheses with a Poisson count model which relates the im-
plementation of a patent box in a foreign affiliate to the number of domestically
2Focusing on granted applications allows to better capture actual research activity rather
than strategic patent filing and is thus commonly used in the literature (e.g. Aghion et al., 2013;
Bena & Li, 2014; Seru, 2014; Stiebale, 2016).
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developed patents of a firm while controlling for various location-, firm- and group-
specific variables that might drive innovative activity. Our estimation results sug-
gest that the implementation of a patent box without nexus requirements raises
R&D activity by 73.67 percent in firms with a cross-border link to the implement-
ing country. When relating this effect to the implied tax difference between firm
and affiliate location, we find that a one percentage point difference in the tax
rate resulting from a patent box introduction leads to an increase of R&D activity
by 2.10 percent.
These positive externalities are robust to controlling for domestic tax-related
input incentives such as super-deductions and credits. They also pertain when
we adjust the patent count for heterogeneity in the patent quality. For patent
boxes with nexus requirements, we find negative, and much smaller cross-border
externalities. However, this finding is not robust once we include a set of relevant
control variables. As an additional result, we find that both types of patent box
regimes reduce the average patent quality in related firms abroad. This result can
be explained by the sorting of patents according to their profitability which is
similar to the sorting mechanism of firms with different levels of productivity in
Melitz et al. (2004) and related findings for tax competition by Becker et al. (2012)
and Haufler & Sta¨hler (2013). Patent boxes with nexus requirement probably
lead to the reallocation of the most profitable patents while those without nexus
requirement allow the firm to realize more but also less profitable R&D projects.
Our analysis contributes to the large literature that relates tax policy to R&D
activity. In particular, researchers have established a link between corporate tax-
ation and investment in R&D (Mamuneas & Nadiri, 1996; Bloom et al., 2002;
Wilson, 2009), the location choice of intangible assets within multinational firms
(Dischinger & Riedel, 2011; Karkinsky & Riedel, 2012; Griffith et al., 2014) and
the quality of patents (Ernst et al., 2014). Only few papers analyze international
spillovers of tax policy, but all of them relying on macro-level data of R&D activ-
ity. For example, Wilson (2009) uses aggregate R&D data from US states to show
that large part of the R&D increasing effect of tax credits is due to a reallocation
of research activity between states. In contrast, our paper uses micro-level data
to establish positive cross-border externalities of output-related tax incentives as
a novel effect of tax policy on R&D.
In addition, we also contribute to the growing literature on patent box regimes.
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In this field, more normative analyses (e.g. Evers et al., 2015) have recently been
complemented by empirical studies (e.g. Bradley et al., 2015). To the best of our
knowledge, our paper is the first to empirically analyze cross-border externalities
of patent boxes on real R&D activity.
Finally, our analysis is related to the literature on tax havens. As noted above,
by implementing patent boxes, the respective countries effectively become tax
havens for intangible assets. Thus, the criticism that is put forward against tax
havens (e.g. Dharmapala, 2008; Slemrod & Wilson, 2009) may also apply to patent
box countries. Depending on their design, they may divert firm profits away from
the location of real activity and thus erode the tax base of high-tax locations.
Alternatively one could apply the more positive view of Hong & Smart (2010)
and Desai et al. (2006). They argue that low-tax jurisdictions may be beneficial
because they enable governments to implicitly differentiate between mobile and
immobile firms, even if they cannot distinguish between the two types or are
not willing to do so because of political reasons. As a first-order effect, allowing
mobile firms to shift profits to low-tax locations lowers the user cost of capital in
high-tax locations and increases investment there. The simple notion underlying
these arguments is that there are real responses of domestic firms to tax incentives
abroad. Our empirical results suggest that such a mechanism exists with regard
to R&D investments.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops a simple
theoretical framework for our analysis and characterizes existing patent boxes.
We explain the empirical strategy in Section 3 and describe the data collection in
Section 4. Results are presented in Section 5 while Section 6 concludes.
2 Externalities from Patent Boxes
2.1 Theoretical Framework
In this section, we set up a simple theoretical model to analyze the reaction of
the R&D investment of a particular firm i to the introduction of a patent box in
the country one of its foreign affiliates resides. Throughout the analysis, our focus
will thus be on the number of successfully realized research projects, measured as
granted patent applications, at the location of i rather than the overall research
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activity in all affiliates of the multinational company.
Each firm i can choose to realize projects from a given set of potential research
undertakings indicated by s = 1, ..., ni. The return to each project is given by
rs = (1− t)pis − c and is defined as the difference between the net profit, defined
as revenue less deductible cost after taxes, (1− t)pis, and some non-deductible
fixed costs c. The latter may comprise costs that are hard to price and usually
not considered as deductible expenses such as the cost of risk-taking, the cost of
becoming acquainted with local patenting institutions or the cost to find and hire
suitable researchers.
The firm realizes any project that yields a positive return rs > 0. We define the
net profit of the cut-off project as p˜i = c
1−t such that the firm realizes all projects
with a net profit of pis > p˜i and disregards projects with pis ≤ p˜i. We can sort
the net profits of all available projects along the interval (
¯
pii, p¯ii) and define the
corresponding cumulative distribution function F . We assume that each realized
research project generates one patent and denote the overall patent count for firm
i by Pi which is given by
Pi = ni (1− F (p˜i)) . (1)
Equation (1) defines the number of patents as a decreasing function of the fixed
cost c and the applicable profit tax rate t.3
So far, the setting applies to a domestic company with no international links.
We now turn to a multinational company. More precisely, we assume that firm i
is located in country h and has an affiliate in country p. The two locations differ
in the fixed cost and may apply different tax rates. We thus denote the return for
a research project s in location l by
rs,l = (1− tl)pis − cl, l ∈ {h, p} . (2)
To simplify the derivation, we assume that firm i incurs a higher fixed cost if it re-
locates its research activity to country p (i.e. cp > ch). Besides the specific charac-
3This can be easily verified by taking the first derivative of Pj with respect to t and c:
∂Pj
∂c = −njf (p˜i) 11−t < 0, ∂Pj∂t = −njf (p˜i) c(1−t)2 < 0
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teristics of the fixed costs described above, this reflects potential reallocation cost
that the firm would have to bear. Reallocation cost include the reestablishment
of new organizational R&D structures in p and effort for convincing researchers
to move.
There are two decisions to be made by the firm. First, it must decide whether
or not to realize a research project. This is done along the rationale described
above by evaluating whether it generates a positive return, rs,l > 0. Second, the
firm must decide where to realize the research project (i.e. in h or p). This is
done by comparing the location-specific returns and choosing l ∈ {h, p} such that
rs,l = max (rs,h, rs,p).
Note that in our analysis, we focus on the number of patents generated by
the firm in its original location h. We begin with the hypothetical situation where
there are no tax differences between the two locations such that th = tp. In this
scenario, the firm locates research in h since cp > ch implies that rs,h > rs,p. All
projects with net profit pis > p˜i =
ch
1−th are realized and the number of generated
patents is given by equation (1).
Now, assume that a patent box is implemented in location p. This reduces
the effective tax rate there such that th > tp. The impact of the patent box on
the number of research projects realized in h depends on its nexus requirements.
For illustrative purposes, we demonstrate the effects of two extreme options: full
nexus and no nexus requirements at all. In the first case, the firm must carry out
all the research in p to be able to opt for the favorable tax regime. Under the
second option, the firm can locate research activity in h but still benefit from the
low tax rate in p. A typical example for this would be the case where a patent box
also allows for the inclusion of acquired patents. The firm can then generate the
patent in h and subsequently transfer it to its affiliate in p where patent profit is
generated via license fees from the firm in h.
Consider first a patent box in p without nexus requirements. In such a scenario,
the firm always allocates the patent rights to the low-tax affiliate in p so that its
profits are taxed there, resulting in tl = tp. However, it keeps research activity
in h because of the fix cost advantage. The return of conducting research in h is
given by rs,h = (1− tp) pis − ch and we can define the profit of the cut-off project
as p˜i′ = ch
1−tp such that all projects with pis > p˜i
′ are realized in h. Note that in
this extreme case, no research is carried out in p because of the higher fixed cost
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there.4 The number of patents in h is then given by
P ′i = ni (1− F (p˜i′)) . (3)
Because of p˜i′ < p˜i we have P ′i > Pi. A patent box without nexus requirement in p
increases research activity in h. The underlying mechanism is very similar to the
concept of the user cost of capital applied in investment theory. If the patent box
requires no change of location of the actual research process, the lower profit tax
effectively increases the return from the patent which decreases the user cost of
capital and makes R&D investment more attractive.
Consider now the situation where p introduces a patent box with full nexus
requirements. The firm will only realize projects in h with a net profit of pis >
p˜i = ch
1−th . However, not all of these projects are necessarily realized in h but
the research activity may also be carried out in p. In particular, the firm will
locate the most profitable research projects to p because for these projects the
tax savings from relocation are the largest. Formally, we define the cut-off profit
for relocating profits by p˜i′′ = cp−ch
th−tp such that all projects with pis < p˜i
′′ are located
in h whereas all other realized projects are located in p. The number of research
projects realized in h is then given by
P ′′i = max (ni (F (p˜i
′′)− F (p˜i)) , 0) (4)
Since F (p˜i′′) ≤ 1, we must have P ′′i ≤ Pi. If the patent box in p requires full nexus,
it provides an incentive for the firm to relocate those projects from h to p whose
profits are sufficiently large such that the resulting tax savings fully compensate
the increase in the fixed cost. Consequently, the number of patents in h decreases
with the introduction of such a patent box.5
Let us assume for illustrative purposes that p˜i′ < p˜i < p˜i′′. This allows us to
graphically display the effect of a patent box introduction. Figure 1 plots the
4This is also a result of our focus on R&D activity in h. To make the model more realistic,
one would have to assume that the affiliate in p also faces a set of potential R&D projects. Such
a set up, however, would complicate our model while not adding any new insights with regard
to the cross-border externalities of tax policy in p on R&D activity of firm j in h.
5Note that this does not necessarily imply that overall research activity of the multinational
company decreases. If the tax benefits in p are large enough, the total number of patents may
even increase. This occurs, however, only because the increase in research activity in p more
than compensates for the decrease in h. Research activity in h always decreases.
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Figure 1: Profit distribution and realized R&D projects
f (pis)
pis
p˜ip˜i′ p˜i′′ p¯i¯
pi
B′ A B
density function of the profits of available research projects. Without a patent
box in location p, the firm realizes all projects with profit above the threshold p˜i
and the share of realized projects is given by area A + B. Introducing a patent
box without nexus makes research more profitable also in h and the firm now
realizes all projects with profit greater than p˜i′ < p˜i. The share of realized projects
increases by the area B′ such that the overall share of projects is given by the
area A + B + B′. In contrast, a patent box with full nexus requirements induces
the firm to realize those projects with profits above p˜i′′ in p. This corresponds to
a share B of available projects. The share of projects realized in h is thus reduced
to area A.
Finally, we observe that the average profit of realized patents in h decreases
with the implementation of a patent box. This can be easily seen when compar-
ing the average profits of the different fractions of research projects in Figure 1.
A formal analysis of this result is presented in Appendix A.1. The sign of the
effect is independent of the nexus requirement of the patent box, but it follows
different intuitions in each case. A patent box without nexus requirements lowers
average patent profits because it allows R&D projects with lower profitability to
be realized. Patent boxes with nexus requirement reduce the average profit in h
because R&D activity for the most profitable projects is relocated to p. The latter
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mechanism is related to the one described for international trade by Melitz et al.
(2004) who show that only the most productive firms relocate internationally. Fur-
thermore, Haufler & Sta¨hler (2013) show in a tax competition model, that more
profitable projects sort into low-tax jurisdictions. Empirical evidence by Becker
et al. (2012) suggests that this effect contributes significantly to the overall tax
base location effect of corporate taxes. In our firm-level analysis below, we show
that a similar mechanism is particularly relevant for corporate R&D activity.
Deviating from the two polar cases of full and no nexus requirements leads
to intermediate cases that offer less clear-cut predictions. In particular, when the
patent box of in a country requires some but not all of the R&D activity to
be generated in this country to be able to opt for the lower tax rate, both the
increasing and decreasing effect on R&D activity in h are present. The overall
impact depends then on which of these effects dominates. The negative effect on
the average profitability of R&D realized in h should, however, prevail.
2.2 Patent Boxes in Practice
Before testing our hypotheses developed above, it is useful to relate our theoret-
ical model to the patent boxes that exist in practice. Evers et al. (2015) provide
a comprehensive overview of the various regimes that have been established since
2000, which has recently been updated by Alstadsæter et al. (2015). In Table 1
we summarize key elements of existing patent box regimes in Europe. In gen-
eral, firms enjoy substantial reductions in effective tax payments when opting
for these regimes but significant differences between individual regimes remain.
Patent boxes differ in the treatment of expenses as well as in the types of intangi-
ble assets they may be applied to beyond patents (e.g. trademarks, brands).The
extent of the tax exemption varies significantly across locations. While the tax
rate on profits from patents is reduced by 35 percentage points in Cyprus, firms
only enjoy a 50 percent exemption in Portugal which implies a decrease in the
statutory tax rate of 11.25 percentage points.
As pointed out above, the extent of nexus requirements of patent boxes is rele-
vant for the sign of their cross-border externalities. In this regard, existing patent
boxes also vary substantially. Some regimes include acquired patents (France,
Hungary, Malta, Cyprus, Turkey). As this allows firms to conduct the actual de-
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velopment of the patent elsewhere and then transfer the resulting patent right to
the patent box location, these regimes correspond to the patent boxes without
nexus requirements described above.
Table 1: Patent box regimes in European countries
Country Year of imple-
mentation
Corporate
income tax
rate (2015)
Patent box tax
rate (2015)
Nexus
Requirement
France 2000 34.0 16.8 No
Hungary 2003 19.0 9.5 No
Netherlands 2007 25.0 5.0 Yes
Spain 2008 30.0 12.0 Yes
Belgium 2008 34.0 6.8 Yes
Luxembourg 2008 29.2 5.8 Yes
Malta 2010 35.0 0.0 No
Cyprus 2012 10.0 2.5 No
United Kingdom 2013 20.0 12.0 Yes
Portugal 2014 22.5 11.3 Yes
Italy 2015 31.4 22.0 Yes
Turkey 2015 20.0 10.0 No
Ireland 2016 12.5 6.3 Yes
Other patent boxes require that at least part of the research activity must be
conducted at the location of benefit, such that firms need to allocate their research
activity to the patent box location in order to fully benefit from the tax exemption.
This approach is taken by patent box regimes in Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain,
Italy, Ireland and Portugal. Other regimes, such as those in Luxembourg and the
United Kingdom, allow for inclusion of patents developed abroad but strongly
limit the extend to which these patents are included in the patent box to avoid
any profit shifting incentives.6 None of these patent boxes imposes a full nexus
6From 2016 onward these regimes are expected to be adjusted to the Modified Nexus Ap-
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requirement as supposed in our theoretical model. Rather, they constitute an
intermediate case in which firms are generally incentivized to relocate their R&D
activity to these countries but some profit shifting opportunities remain.
3 Empirical Strategy
The goal of this paper is to assess the impact of foreign tax reductions for patent
profits on domestic R&D activity. This is achieved by estimating the effect of
the introduction of a patent box regime in countries firms do not reside therein
but have foreign affiliates that do. Following Blundell et al. (1995) and Stiebale
(2016), R&D activity of a firm is measured by its newly registered annual patent
output.7 More formally, we model the number of new granted patent applications
Pijct of firm i member of multinational group j located in country c in period t
as a function of the availability of international patent boxes to a foreign affiliate
and several control variables:
E (Pijct) = exp
(
x′ijctβ
)
with x′ijctβ = α ·BOXjt + βXit + γZjt + δCct + φt + φi + uit
where BOXjt is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if a patent box is implemented
in the country of residence of at least one of the foreign affiliates of firm i and zero
otherwise. Xit, Zjt and Cct are firm, group and location characteristics. φtand
φi capture time- and country-specific effects.
The macroeconomic and institutional variables include productivity measured
as the log of GDP per capita, GDP growth, general research activity measured
as R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP, the corporate income tax rate and
the user cost of capital for R&D. The latter is a composite measure that includes
input-related tax incentives such as tax credits and super-deductions for R&D
proach adopted by the EU and the OECD. This approach allows only for a certain share of
intellectual property income to be included in the patent box which must correspond to the
share of research conducted by the firm itself.
7We account for the time lag between generating an innovation and acceptance of the patent
application by using the date of first patenting application instead of the patent publication
date. The time between the application and the approval of a patent can be up to multiple
years.
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activity. We control for several items that have been suggested to affect R&D
activity on the firm level (see Stiebale, 2016), such as the number of affiliates,
the age of a firm as well as the firm size, measured in total assets, the working
capital and the capital intensity of the firm. Finally, we include firm- and time-
fixed effects to capture cross-sectional differences in the level of R&D output, as
well as general time trends.
The number of patents is primarily measured as the simple count of annual
granted patents per firm. To capture the intensity of domestic R&D activity,
we also conduct our analysis using the quality-weighted number of new patents.
Frequently cited patents registered at multiple patent offices and classified to con-
tribute to many patenting classes are not only more valuable (see Harhoff et al.,
1999), but indicate also a higher R&D input (Hagedoorn & Cloodt, 2003). We
construct patent quality using the composite quality indicator proposed by Lan-
jouw & Schankerman (2004) which is commonly used in this strand of literature
(see, e.g., Hall et al. (2007); Ernst et al. (2014)). The composite quality indicator is
derived by employing a multiple-indicator model relying on the number of forward
citations, the patent family size and the number of patent classifications resulting
in a relative measure for patent quality. The procedure to derive the composite
quality indicator is described in detail in Appendix A.2. For the quality-weighted
number of new patents, we weight each patent by its relative quality and aggregate
it on an annual basis.
We also estimate the effect of a foreign patent box implementation on the
average quality of new patents of a firm. The latter is computed by dividing the
quality-weighted patent count by the number of patents, qijct =
P qual.ijct
Pijct
. To account
for general quality shifts within the same industry as well as level differences across
industries and countries, we then scale this measure by its 2-digit SIC industry,
country and year specific mean q¯sct and obtain q˜ijct =
qijct
q¯sct
. We relate the logarithm
of this relative measure to foreign patent box implementations in a simple fixed
effects regression using a specification that is similar to the one employed in the
Poisson model above:
log (q˜ijct) = ι+ α ·BOXjt + βXit + γZjt + δCct + φt + φi + uit (5)
Note that we are only able to compute the average quality of patents for firm-
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year observations where the firm successfully applied for a patent. In order to not
distort our estimation by potentially confounding effects of the patenting decision
of a firm, we restrict this regression to firms that generate patents before and after
a patent box was implemented in a country one of their foreign affiliates resides.8
A potential source of endogeneity is the structure of the multinational group.
In principal, the multinational group that comprises firms with a high level of
research activity has an incentive to set up a new affiliate in a country as soon
as a new patent box regime is introduced there. To overcome this potential issue
of reverse causality, only multinational groups without changes in their structure
are considered. As a consequence, BOXjt is an exogenous shock to the firm’s
tax incentives insofar as it is purely driven by exogenous policy changes in the
residence countries of its affiliates. Identification thus hinges on the variation in
the timing of the introduction of national patent box regimes.
Finally, we restrict the sample to firms located in non-patent box countries.
This is done for two reasons. First, external effects of patent boxes should generally
not be observed at locations where a patent box is already implemented since in
this case, the foreign tax regime does not provide an additional incentive. Second,
as the focus of this study are spillover effects of patent boxes, patent box locations
must be excluded to avoid any distorting effects of the implementation of domestic
patent boxes that may or may not coincide with the implementation of patent
boxes abroad. After the exclusion of patent box locations for our sample period
2000-2012 there remain 23 locations which are listed in Table 2.
4 Data
The analysis is based on a rich panel dataset built by combining multiple data
sources on patent data, firm information and patent box characteristics for the
period 2000-2012. Patent data is taken from the PATSTAT database operated by
the European Patent Office (EPO). PATSTAT is a comprehensive data source
covering patent data for over 80 countries in a harmonized way (Jacob, 2013).
For the econometric analysis we count the number of granted patents per firm for
each year.
In our analysis we focus on domestically developed patents. In principal, the
8We also estimated equation 5 on the full sample and obtain virtually the same result.
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country of residence of the firm applying for a patent does not necessarily con-
stitute the place of development of the patent. As is common in the literature,
we identify whether or not a patent was developed at the location of the firm by
using address information of the inventors (Guellec & de la Potterie, 2001). A
patent is classified as domestic if the majority of its inventors reside in the same
Table 2: New Patents, 2000-2012
Number of
firms in
sample
Share of firms with affiliate
in patent box location
Avg. new dom.
patents per year
Avg. new dom.
patents per year
(qual. wt.)w nexus
requirement
w/o nexus
requirement
AT 906 0.15 0.16 0.40 0.22
BG 109 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.06
CH 1,028 0.28 0.26 0.43 0.26
CZ 731 0.04 0.05 0.25 0.09
DE 10,261 0.11 0.12 0.38 0.20
DK 462 0.15 0.17 0.31 0.19
EE 42 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.09
FI 441 0.14 0.16 0.38 0.22
GB 3,324 0.17 0.20 0.30 0.19
GR 13 0.23 0.07 0.33 0.21
HR 18 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.07
IE 134 0.14 0.11 0.27 0.18
IS 8 0.00 0.13 0.15 0.11
IT 3,289 0.05 0.05 0.27 0.15
LT 19 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.06
LV 42 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.06
NO 462 0.08 0.12 0.26 0.16
PL 422 0.06 0.07 0.28 0.14
RO 145 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.08
SE 750 0.21 0.22 0.34 0.21
SI 144 0.03 0.03 0.27 0.11
SK 51 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.11
TR 399 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.08
Total 23,200 0.12 0.13 0.34 0.19
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country as the firm which filed the application.9 We remove outliers by trimming
the sample at the 99 percentile of annual domestic patent output.
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of the firm locations we include in our
sample. Research activity is particularly strong in Switzerland, Austria and Ger-
many with average annual domestically developed patents per firm of 0.43, 0.40
and 0.38 respectively.
We obtain PATSTAT patent data through Orbis which is a Bureau van Dijk
database. This allows us to link patents of the applying firms to the comprehen-
sive ownership information contained in the Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database
via unique identifiers. By exploiting the ownership structure, we are able to iden-
tify the ultimate owner for each firm in the sample. We construct multinational
groups by assigning firms with a common ultimate owner to the same group. This
approach is complemented by checking whether the firm existed throughout the
whole observation period to exclude tax-driven affiliate establishment in patent
box countries. Finally, we combine the ownership information with data on merg-
ers and acquisitions (M&A) from Bureau van Dijk’s Zephyr database to capture
ownership changes within the observation period. We exclude all groups where
the firm structure changed with respect to the patent box locations displayed in
Table 1. That is, all groups are excluded where one of the affiliates in a location
that has implemented a patent box regime has been established, acquired or sold
during our sample period. In line with Stiebale (2016), we further restrict our
sample to industries where patenting is actually relevant. We include firms active
in the manufacturing sector, as well as, several knowledge-intensive service sectors
such as information technology, telecommunications, transport, R&D, or business-
related services.10 Table 2 provides information on the geographical distribution
of firm observations.
9For those patents with no inventor information provided by PATSTAT, it is assumed that
the patent was developed domestically. As a robustness check, it is also assumed that all patents
without inventor information provided are non-domestic ones. The results still hold true implying
that these patents are not systematically different from those with inventor information.
10This excludes financial services. We identify relevant sectors via 2-digit NACE Rev. 2 codes
and include firms with codes NACE 2 codes 10-32, 51-53, 58-63, 69-74 and 77-82.
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Table 3: Summary Statistics
Number of
Observations
Mean Standard
Deviation
Min Max
New patent appl. 271,251 0.338 0.864 0 7
New patent appl. (qual. adj.) 271,251 0.186 0.525 0 6.929
BOX 271,251 0.116 0.320 0 1
BOXNexus 271,251 0.060 0.238 0 1
∆t 261,950 1.788 6.383 0 31.4
Number of affiliates 271,251 190.203 705.738 0 15,747
Log Age 226,721 2.671 1.056 0 6.592
Log Total Assets 271,212 9.121 2.474 -8.151 17.342
Working Capital 271,213 -6.992 2041.411 -769 344,827
Log Capital Intensity 261,969 -2.760 2.267 -24.136 10.815
Corporate income tax rate 271,251 31.974 7.104 10 52
User cost of R&D capital 271,251 0.337 0.022 0.241 0.350
Real interest rate 261,786 0.056 0.020 -0.014 0.265
R&D expenditure (% of GDP) 259,629 2.079 0.731 0.323 3.913
GDP p.c. 269,553 35762.050 10,069.710 2,750.587 69,094.750
GDP Growth 269,553 1.437 2.668 -14.814 11.902
We also obtain balance sheet items as well as firm age from Amadeus. Working
capital is computed by scaling the difference between current assets and current
liabilities with total assets, while the capital intensity is defined as the ratio of
tangible fixed assets and sales.11
Macroeconomic control variables are obtained from the World Bank’s World
Development Indicators (WDI) and the OECD. Tax policy indicators are collected
from the IBFD tax database. When computing the user cost of capital, we follow
Bloom et al. (2002) and incorporate the input incentives, the applicable tax rate
and the fixed depreciation rate into a measure for the user cost of a domestic
R&D investment. In order to isolate the effect of tax policy on R&D activity, we
calculate the user cost using a fixed interest rate of 5 percent.12 Table 3 provides
summary statistics for all variables used in the empirical analysis.
11Missing entries for the necessary variables are replaced by annual industry (2-digit US SIC
code) means.
12See Appendix A.3 for a detailed description of the calculation of user cost of capital.
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5 Results
5.1 R&D Quantity
Table 4 contains our estimation results. The parsimonious specification in column
(1) relies solely on the BOX dummy that indicates the implementation of a
patent box without nexus requirement a country one of the affiliates of a firm,
and year-fixed as well as firm-fixed effects. Having an affiliate in a patent box
country leads to a highly significant increase of domestic patenting activity of
60.9 log points. This translates into an increase of annual research activity by
83.85 percent. Evaluated at the sample mean, this indicates that a firm with an
affiliate in an international patent box country registers one patent every one and
a half years instead of every three years when compared to a similar firm without
affiliates benefiting from a patent box regime. This points to a strong external
effect of foreign tax incentives on domestic research activity. Our results suggest
that a decline in the user cost of capital within a multinational group spills over
to group members with no relevant tax policy change.13
In column (2) of Table 4, we include various characteristics of the firm-location
that could affect R&D activity. R&D expenditure as a share of GDP and labor
productivity measured as GDP per capita significantly increase patent output
of firms. On the contrary, an increase in the corporate income tax rate is ex-
pected to induce a decline in innovative activity. The coefficient for the patent
box implementation dummy remains significantly positive, albeit smaller than in
the specification without controls. Hence, our estimated effect is not driven by
coinciding tax policy changes or macroeconomic fluctuations.
We have noted above that patent boxes constitute an effective policy to attract
foreign R&D investments and are thus a relevant instrument for international tax
competition. One concern with regard to our analysis may be that those countries
without a patent box have instead turned to input-related tax incentives in order
to remain competitive R&D locations. If these alternative incentives are the main
drivers of above observed increased domestic patenting activity, this would still
hint to international spillover effects of patent boxes. Instead of a direct impact
on the user cost of capital, the spillover would then be observable via policy
13If there are multiple affiliates of the multinational group in a country with no relevant tax
policy change, all of them are affected similarly (see Table A.2 in the Appendix).
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Table 4: Benchmark
No. of new Patents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BOX 0.609***
(0.193)
0.552***
(0.193)
0.556***
(0.201)
BOX ×∆t 0.022***
(0.008)
0.022***
(0.008)
0.021***
(0.008)
R&D Exp. 0.155***
(0.060)
0.368***
(0.066)
0.172***
(0.062)
0.372***
(0.067)
Log GDP p.c. -0.953***
(0.207)
0.643**
(0.256)
-1.013***
(0.212)
0.662**
(0.259)
CIT -0.003
(0.002)
0.003
(0.003)
-0.004*
(0.002)
0.003
(0.003)
GDP Growth -0.012**
(0.005)
-0.002
(0.006)
-0.011**
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.006)
User Cost of
R&D
-1.984***
(0.474)
-1.157
(0.897)
-1.880***
(0.479)
-1.175
(0.907)
Real interest
rate
-0.883*
(0.482)
-0.420
(0.565)
-0.903*
(0.501)
-0.461
(0.575)
No. of affiliates 0.000
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
Log Age 0.098***
(0.022)
0.103***
(0.023)
Log Total Assets 0.039***
(0.006)
0.038***
(0.006)
Working Capital 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Log Capital
Intensity
0.018***
(0.005)
0.018***
(0.005)
N 271,251 248,889 194,139 259,624 238,133 190,974
No. of firms 23,200 21,880 17,706 22,082 20,819 17,250
Pseudo LL -132,824 -122,243 -99,060 -126,815 -116,662 -96,718
Estimation of a Poisson fixed effects model. The dependent variable is the number of new patents
per year and firm for which the majority of inventors does not reside outside the country of
residence of the firm. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the firm level) are provided in
parentheses. All regressions include firm- and year-fixed effects. Stars behind coefficients indicate
the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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interactions in a fiscal competition game.
To account for this, column (2) also includes the user cost of capital as a con-
trol. Consistent with previous findings (e.g. Bloom et al., 2002; Wilson, 2009),
our estimates suggest that an increase in the user cost of R&D capital leads to
a decline in corporate R&D investment. It is also apparent that the evolution of
domestic R&D input incentives does not drive our results regarding the imple-
mentation of patent box regimes in affiliate countries. The respective coefficient
remains significantly positive and similar in magnitude throughout all specifica-
tions.
In column (3) we add firm- and group-level controls. The significantly positive
coefficients of total assets and the firm age indicate that, consistent with previ-
ous findings, larger and also older firms conduct more R&D activity. Again, the
coefficient of BOX decreases relatively to the previous specifications but remains
significantly positive. It suggests that the number of patent output of a firm in-
creases by about 73.67 percent when a patent box without nexus requirements is
implemented in one of the locations of its affiliates.
In columns (4) to (6) of Table 4 we also account for the heterogeneity in the
tax rate changes induced by different patent boxes. Instead of a simple imple-
mentation dummy, we use the tax rate divergence between the location of the
firm and the patent box country that results from the patent box regime. More
specifically, we take the difference between the corporate income tax rate in the
residence country of the firm and the applicable tax rate for patent profits in the
relevant affiliate country after the introduction of the patent box and interact it
with our implementation dummy BOX. We then repeat regressions (1) to (3)
using our more sophisticated measure for the patent box implementation. Again,
the coefficient of interest is significantly positive. Focusing on conservative specifi-
cation of column (6) that also includes the full set of controls, our results suggest
that a patent box that induces a tax difference of 1 percentage point between the
residence country of the firm and the relevant affiliate country raises the number
of patent output by 2.10 percent. For example, take the example of a firm residing
in Germany that has an affiliate in Hungary. The patent box implementation in
the affiliate location in 2003 implied a tax differential of 31.2 percent. Our esti-
mates suggest that this increased research activity in the German firm by 66.21
percent.
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Table 5: Accounting for Quality Differences
No. of new Patent (quality-weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BOX 0.596***
(0.204)
0.447**
(0.198)
0.480**
(0.213)
BOX ×∆t 0.017**
(0.008)
0.016**
(0.008)
0.018**
(0.008)
R&D exp. 0.344***
(0.067)
0.473***
(0.074)
0.360***
(0.069)
0.476***
(0.075)
Log GDP p.c. 0.242
(0.229)
1.514***
(0.280)
0.223
(0.234)
1.546***
(0.282)
CIT -0.003
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.003)
-0.004
(0.002)
-0.001
(0.003)
GDP Growth -0.018***
(0.006)
-0.009
(0.006)
-0.018***
(0.006)
-0.009
(0.006)
User Cost of
R&D
-0.260
(0.531)
0.419
(1.014)
-0.139
(0.536)
0.388
(1.024)
Real interest
rate
-0.833
(0.516)
-0.946
(0.603)
-0.837
(0.538)
-1.015*
(0.614)
No. of affiliates 0.000
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
Log Age 0.098***
(0.024)
0.108***
(0.025)
Log Total Assets 0.030***
(0.006)
0.029***
(0.006)
Working Capital 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Log Capital
Intensity
0.018***
(0.005)
0.018***
(0.005)
N 262,455 240,515 191,270 251,118 230,026 188,195
No. of firms 22,467 21,166 17,415 21,378 20,131 16,971
Pseudo LL -77,200 -71,472 -58,192 -73,445 -67,965 -56,583
Estimation of a Poisson fixed effects model. The dependent variable is the number of new
patents measured weighted by their relative quality per year and firm for which the majority of
inventors does not reside outside the country of residence of the firm. Cluster robust standard
errors (clustered at the firm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include firm- and
year-fixed effects. Stars behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Our main results in Table 4 show strong and positive cross-border externalities
of patent boxes without nexus requirements. This suggests that these patent boxes
reduce not only the user cost of capital for R&D investment of domestic firms but
also of their foreign affiliates by providing them with an effective profit shifting
opportunity that reduces their prospective tax burden.
In a second step, we use quality-weighted patent count as a dependent variable
to account for the fact that patents may vary strongly with regard to their quality,
usefulness and applicability (see Hall et al., 2010). Table 5 presents the results from
repeating the regressions of Table 4 with this new dependent variable.
Throughout the specifications, the coefficients of the patent box implementa-
tion dummy as well as the one for the more sophisticated measure of the patent
box induced tax difference remain significantly positive. Again, after including
location-, firm- and group-specific controls suggests that our results are not driven
by macroeconomic factors or endogenous firm selection. We note that the coeffi-
cients for the variables of interest are slightly smaller than in the regression with
a simple patent count. This may reflect that there exist cross-border externalities
of patent boxes not only with respect to the quantity of patent output but also
with respect to their quality. Given our theoretical analysis, this is not surprising
and we turn to this additional effect in more detail below.
Finally, we are interested in the cross-border effect of patent boxes with some
nexus requirement on R&D activity. In Table 6 we thus present results of a Poisson
fixed effects estimation that relates the simple and quality-weighted patent count
to a dummy BOXNexus that switches to one when the residence country one of the
foreign affiliates of the firm implements a patent box with some nexus requirement.
Column (1) reports the results of the parsimonious fixed-effects regression con-
taining only the implementation dummy. Consistent with our theoretical analysis
above, the corresponding coefficient is negative which suggests that patent boxes
with some nexus requirement lure away R&D activity from locations abroad.
However, this effect is not symmetric to the one obtained for patent boxes with-
out nexus requirements. We observe that its magnitude is substantially smaller
(about one tenth) and the coefficient estimate is not robust when including the
full set of controls. Our findings are similar when we use the quality-weighted
patent count as dependent variable. Thus, we cannot identify the same clear-cut
result derived for the case of full nexus requirement. Nevertheless, we can conclude
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Table 6: Patent Boxes With Nexus Requirement
No. of new Patents No. of new Patents
(quality-weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BOXNexus -0.056**
(0.028)
0.032
(0.029)
-0.102***
(0.029)
-0.037
(0.031)
R&D exp. 0.373***
(0.066)
0.477***
(0.074)
Log GDP p.c. 0.663***
(0.257)
1.482***
(0.282)
CIT 0.003
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.003)
GDP Growth -0.002
(0.006)
-0.009
(0.006)
User Cost of R&D -1.121
(0.895)
0.488
(1.011)
Real interest rate -0.424
(0.565)
-0.932
(0.603)
No. of affiliates 0.000
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)
Log Age 0.099***
(0.022)
0.096***
(0.024)
Log Total Assets 0.039***
(0.006)
0.031***
(0.006)
Working Capital 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Log Capital Intensity 0.018***
(0.005)
0.018***
(0.005)
N 271,251 194,139 262,455 191,270
No. of firms 23,200 17,706 22,467 17,415
Pseudo LL -132,827 -99,065 -77,192 -58,193
Estimation of a Poisson fixed effects model. The dependent variable is the number of new
(quality-weighted) patents per year and firm for which the majority of inventors does not reside
outside the country of residence of the firm. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the
firm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include firm- and year-fixed effects. Stars
behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 7: Patent Quality
Patent Quality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BOX -0.258**
(0.114)
-0.279**
(0.125)
BOXNexus -0.091***
(0.012)
-0.079***
(0.014)
R&D exp. 0.103***
(0.036)
0.119***
(0.039)
Log GDP p.c. -0.217*
(0.130)
-0.289**
(0.135)
CIT -0.000
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
GDP Growth -0.003
(0.003)
-0.000
(0.003)
User Cost of R&D 0.006
(0.552)
0.619
(0.552)
Real interest rate -0.278
(0.326)
-0.230
(0.343)
No. of affiliates -0.000
(0.000)
-0.000***
(0.000)
Log Age -0.005
(0.015)
-0.013
(0.016)
Log Total Assets -0.022***
(0.004)
-0.021***
(0.004)
Working Capital 0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
Log Capital Intensity -0.000
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.004)
N 52,293 41,578 44,760 34,346
No. of firms 22,152 17,526 18,129 13,560
Pseudo LL -20,925 -18,002 -18,436 -15,6771
Estimation of an OLS fixed effects model. The dependent variable is the logarithm of average
patent quality per year and firm for patents for which the majority of inventors does not reside
outside the country of residence of the firm. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the
firm level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include firm- and year-fixed effects. Stars
behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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that, consistent with the theoretical model, positive cross-border externalities of
patent boxes only occur when the lack of nexus requirement allows some post-
development profit shifting.
5.2 R&D Quality
In Table 5, we present the result for estimating the cross-border spillover of a
patent box implementation on the average quality of patents. Column (1) con-
tains the parsimonious regression result relying on a single dummy indicating
whether the firm runs an affiliate in a country with a patent box without nexus
requirement implemented. The negative coefficient suggests that the patent box
implementation leads to a reduction in relative patent quality. This result is ro-
bust when including the full set of control variables. In columns (3) and (4), the
regressions are repeated but with a dummy with value one if firms have an affiliate
residing in a country with a patent box with nexus requirement implemented. Hav-
ing an affiliate in such a country reduces the average quality of domestic patents,
albeit to a lesser extent.
The negative cross-border effect of patent boxes with and without nexus
requirement possibly reflects a decrease in the average profitability of granted
patents, which is consistent with our theoretical findings above. Note that even
though the direction of the effect does not depend on the nexus requirement of the
patent box, our model suggests that the underlying mechanism differs between the
two types of patent boxes. This may also explain the difference in the magnitude
of the coefficients. The estimated effect on average patent quality is about three
times larger for a patent box without nexus requirement than for a patent box
with nexus requirement.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we combine information on firm ownership, research activity and
output-related R&D tax incentives to identify cross-border spillover effects of tax
policy within multinational groups. In particular, we analyze the impact of the
introduction of a patent box without nexus requirement in a foreign affiliate loca-
tion that allows domestic firms to reduce the user cost of capital by shifting patent
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profits abroad. Our results indicate that this foreign tax incentive transmits to the
domestic firm which increases its research activity by approximately 74 percent
or 2 percent per percentage point of induced tax rate differential. Consistent with
our theoretical analysis that limits positive cross-border externalities to patent
boxes without nexus requirements, we do not find this effect for patent boxes
with nexus requirements. Furthermore, we show that, following the predictions of
our theoretical model, cross-border spillovers of patent boxes on average patent
quality are generally negative.
These results have several important implications. First, they support theo-
retical analyses by Desai et al. (2006) and Hong & Smart (2010), who argue that
the presence of low-tax countries reduces the user cost of capital for investment in
high-tax countries. Although it remains questionable if tax havens are beneficial
from an overall welfare perspective, it is interesting to observe that one relevant
channel through which they might cause positive externalities can actually be ob-
served in the data. Our results are of course limited to investment in intangible
assets which are particularly mobile with regard to the allocation of related prof-
its. The effect may be weaker for investments whose profits cannot be shifted as
easily.
Second, these findings inform the ongoing debate on patent boxes. Some coun-
tries have argued that patent boxes are not effective in fostering research activity
but merely constitute an instrument for harmful tax competition. Our results indi-
cate that if patent box regimes include non-domestically developed patents, other
countries without patent box regimes may indirectly benefit because the implicit
tax reduction for multinational companies increases corporate R&D activity there.
An assessment of the overall welfare impact is precluded by the fact that we do
not observe foregone revenue in the location of the domestic firm. Nevertheless,
the results presented above suggest that the expected increase in domestic tax
revenue resulting from restricting profit shifting opportunities to foreign patent
box countries must be weighed against the negative impact on domestic research
activity. Somewhat surprisingly, those patent boxes that provide the best oppor-
tunity for profit shifting are actually the regimes that have the strongest positive
effect on research activity in non-patent box countries.
Results from our theoretical analysis suggest that there are two consecutive
firm responses to the introduction of foreign patent boxes without nexus require-
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ments. Companies first raise R&D output and then locate the resulting patent
rights to the patent box location. In our empirical analysis we have verified the
first step which is relevant for the cross-border implications of patent boxes on real
R&D activity. Since we lack data on the post-application relocation of patents,
we cannot identify the second step. We note, however, that empirical findings of
previous studies suggest that profit shifting via the transfer of patent rights is a
very relevant phenomenon (see Dischinger & Riedel, 2011; Karkinsky & Riedel,
2012). Furthermore, we are interested in the impact of patent boxes on corporate
R&D investment rather than on the resulting profit allocation. As is generally the
case for corporate investment decisions, the former effect depends on the expected
tax rate on future profits. Thus, the change of prospective taxation induced by
the patent box, which we capture in our empirical specification, is decisive.
Nevertheless, future research may aim at measuring the impact on the sub-
sequent allocation of patent profits. This would provide a more comprehensive
picture of the underlying economic mechanism and would enable us to determine
whether it is the change in prospective or the actually realized tax burden of R&D
investment that drives the positive cross-border spillovers of patent boxes.
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Appendix
A.1 Patent Boxes and Average Patent Quality
Let us denote by Π, Π′ and Π′′ the average profits of realized projects of firm i in h
without a patent box in p, with a patent box in p that has no nexus requirements
and with a patent box in p that requires full nexus, respectively. The average
profits are given by
Π =
∫ p¯i
p˜i
pisf (pis) dpis, Π
′ =
∫ p¯i
p˜i′
pisf (pis) dpis, Π
′′ =
∫ p˜i′′
p˜i
pisf (pis) dpis. (A.1)
Note that
29
Π > Π′ ⇐⇒
∫ p¯i
p˜i′
pisf (pis) dpis −
∫ p¯i
p˜i
pisf (pis) dpis > 0
⇐⇒
∫ p˜i
p˜i′
pisf (pis) dpis > 0
where the last inequality follows from p˜i > p˜i′. Furthermore
Π > Π′′ ⇐⇒
∫ p¯i
p˜i
pisf (pis) dpis −
∫ p˜i′′
p˜i
pisf (pis) dpis > 0
⇐⇒
∫ p¯i
p˜i′′
pisf (pis) dpis > 0
where the lase inequality holds whenever p˜i′′ is interior (i.e. p˜i′′ < p¯i).
A.2 Composite Patent Quality Indicator
Patent quality is a latent variable which is not directly observable in the data.
To approximate it, we follow the approach proposed by Lanjouw & Schanker-
man (2004) and employ a multiple-indicator model with one unobserved common
factor. We use three different indicators, namely forward citations, patent fam-
ily size and number of patent classifications codes (IPC classes). Therefore, the
underlying equations for the multiple-indicator model are
yk,s = λkvs + βX + ek,s, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
where yk,s is the value of quality indicator k for patent s, vs indicates the common
factor, λk represents the factor loading, X contains common controls and ek,s ∼
N(0, σ2) is the idiosyncratic component with Cov(ek,s, ek,r) = 0, s 6= r. Since the
term λkvs is latent, we estimate the reduced form of the equations:
yk,s = βX + uk,s, k ∈ {1, 2, 3}
where uk,s = λkvs + ek,s combines a common component λkvs and a idiosyncratic
component ek,s. We estimate these equations using three stage least squares em-
ploying for X controls for the year of application and main technology class of
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the patent. To gather λk and vs, we conduct in a further step a factor analysis
using maximum likelihood to decompose uk,s. The estimated factor loadings are
presented in Table A.1.
Table A.1: Factor loadings
Indicator Factor loading
Forward citations 0.6201
Patent family size 0.3593
Patent classification codes 0.1229
Results from factor analysis of the residuals from regressing each indicator on year and industry
class dummies. Factor loadings represent both weighting of the indicator and correlation between
indicator and patent quality.
We use the estimated factor loadings to calculate the composite quality indi-
cator for each patent. The composite quality indicator is a relative measure to
determine the quality of patents and is normally distributed with mean zero. To
construct the quality-weighted annual patent count, we transform the distribution
by adding the value of the patent with lowest patent quality so that all composite
quality indicators turn positive. After this transformation the composite quality
indicator for each patent has a positive value and can be used as weight for sum-
ming up patent output. The implied relative ordering of the quality of patents is
unaffected by this transformation.
A.3 User Cost of R&D Investment
The computation of the user cost strongly follows the derivation of Bloom et al.
(2002) who extend its standard expression as presented by Hall & Jorgenson (1967)
to R&D investment. The user cost is defined as the pre-tax financial return ρ for
a marginal R&D investment project (i.e. a project with zero economic rent). The
economic rent of any R&D project is given by
R = (1 + i) dVt = dDt + dVt+1
=
(ρ+ δ)
(
1− τCIT )+ (1− δ) (AD + AC)
1 + r
− (1− (AD + AC))
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where dVt is the change in the market value of the firm and dDt is the change
in dividends paid out by the firm that results from the investment. i denotes
the nominal and r the real market interest rate and δ is the economic rate of
depreciation. AD and AC are the net present values of the additional deductions
and the tax credit, respectively, and are given by
AD =
φ (1 + r)
φ+ r
τCIT , AC = ϕ (A.2)
where φ is the additional deduction rate and ϕ is the credit rate. To obtain the
user cost, we set R = 0 and solve for ρ. This yields
ρ =
1− (AD + AC)
1− τCIT (r + δ) (A.3)
We compute ρct for every country and year and follow Bloom et al. (2002) in
setting δ = 0.3 and r = 0.05. Tax policy variables are obtained from the IBFD
database.
A.4 Consolidated Affiliates
For the results in Table A.2, we consolidated firm data of affiliates located in the
same country which are member of the same group. The point estimates for the
BOX dummy are very similar to the results in Table 4 and 5.
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Table A.2: Consolidated group affiliates
No. of new Patents No. of new Patents
(quality-weighted)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BOX 0.627***
(0.194)
0.582***
(0.194)
0.638***
(0.211)
0.499**
(0.209)
R&D Exp. 0.247***
(0.072)
0.381***
(0.070)
Log GDP p.c. 0.597**
(0.280)
1.571***
(0.269)
CIT -0.002
(0.006)
-0.001
(0.003)
GDP Growth -0.013**
(0.006)
-0.017***
(0.006)
User Cost of R&D -0.846*
(0.432)
1.032**
(0.507)
Real interest rate -0.977
(0.913)
-0.982
(0.653)
Log Age -0.093***
(0.015)
-0.095***
(0.016)
Log Total Assets 0.000***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
Working Capital 0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)
Log Capital Intensity 0.001***
(0.000)
0.000***
(0.000)
N 208,166 181,602 205,016 178,920
No. of firms 17,972 16,315 17,680 16,049
Pseudo LL -109,197 -96,460 -63,853 -56,892
Estimation of a Poisson fixed effects model. The dependent variable is the number of (quality-
weighted) patents per year and firm for which the majority of inventors does not reside outside
the country of residence of the firm. All firm data of firms belonging to the same multinational
group is consolidated at the country level. Cluster robust standard errors (clustered at the firm
level) are provided in parentheses. All regressions include firm- and year-fixed effects. Stars
behind coefficients indicate the significance level, * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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